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Jamaica Constabulary Force



Three Year Anti-Gang Strategic Plan

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Table of Contents

1.	Brief Strategic Summary.....	3
2.	Introduction.....	4
3.	Developing Community-Based Anti-Gang Reduction Philosophy	5
	3.1. Defining Gangs.....	5
	3.2. Important Terms and Definitions.....	6
	3.3. Community-Based Gang Reduction Model.....	7
4.	Building JCF Capacity.....	8
	4.1. An Operational View of Gangs.....	8
	4.2. Jamaica Constabulary Enforcement Model.....	9
	4.3. Organized Crime Investigation Division Gang Detail.....	10
	4.3.1. Development Matrix.....	10
	4.4. Divisional Uniformed Gang Enforcement.....	11
	4.4.1. Development Matrix.....	11
	4.5. Covert Tactical/Evidence Gathering.....	12
	4.5.1. Development Matrix.....	12
	4.6. Tactical Support/Suppression.....	13
	4.6.1. Development Matrix.....	13
	4.7. Intelligence.....	14
	4.7.1. National Intelligence Bureau.....	14
	4.7.2. Vetting.....	14
	4.7.3. Division Intelligence Units.....	14
	4.7.4. Intra-NIB Communication.....	14
	4.7.5. Other Intelligence Units.....	14
	4.7.6. Dissemination of Work Products.....	15
	4.7.7. Confidential and Covert Human Intelligence Sources.....	15
	4.7.8. Gang Expertise.....	15
	4.7.9. Generating Raw Information.....	15
	4.7.10. Debriefing Arrested Persons.....	15
	4.8. Training.....	16
	4.8.1. Gang Awareness Course.....	16
	4.8.2. Advanced Gang Awareness Course.....	16
	4.8.3. Gang Investigator Course.....	17
	4.8.4. Human Rights and Ethics.....	17
	4.9. Media Relations.....	17
	4.10. Building Overall Capacity.....	17
	4.10.1. Cold Case Unit.....	17
	4.10.2. Forensic Science.....	18
	4.10.3. Interview and Interrogation.....	18
	4.10.4. One Island, One Police Force.....	18
5.	Coordination and Intervention.....	19
	5.1. Implementation Working Group.....	20
	5.1.1 Development Matrix Implementation Working Group.....	21
	5.2. Social Services Coordination.....	21
	5.2.1. Proposal Social Services Coordination.....	23
	5.2.2. Recommendations Social Services Coordination.....	23
	5.2.3. Matrix Social Services Coordination.....	24

5.3. Oversight.....	25
5.3.1. Development Matrix Oversight.....	26
5.4. Implementation Secretariat.....	27
5.5. Organizational Chart.....	28
6. Economic and Financial Crimes.....	29
6.1. Proposal Economic and Financial Crimes.....	30
6.2. Recommendations Economic and Financial Crimes.....	31
6.3 Development Matrix Economic and Financial Crimes.....	32
7. Judicial System.....	33
7.1. Recommendations Judicial.....	34
7.2. Vertical Prosecution.....	34
8. Program Management.....	34
9. Community-Based Gang Reduction Three-Year Flowchart.....	35

1. Brief Strategic Summary

The following three-year Anti-Gang Strategic Plan combines the following 12 strategic measures:

- Establish a gang unit within Organized Crime Investigation Division (OCID);
- Establish a dedicated uniformed gang enforcement unit in each of the 19 Geographic Divisions;
- Develop and dedicate covert evidence gathering and covert tactical resources within the current Flying Squad;
- Designate one company of the Mobile Reserve as a Gang Response Unit;
- Conduct Gang Specific Training;
- Strengthen the intelligence gathering and dissemination process;
- Create operational Implementation Working Group;
- Widen and strengthen Social Services umbrella group, under PIOJ's Community Renewal Program (CRP) as a basic coordination mechanism;
- Ensure that S&JWG adapted, empowered and motivated to oversee implementation of anti-gang Strategic Plan;
- Establish or strengthen a fully operational, independent and universal body, with the official mandate and competence to investigate and prosecute all Economic & Financial Crime offenders, wherever they may be in Jamaica;
- Strengthen the Judiciary; and,
- Employ an Anti-Gang programme manager.

2. Introduction

(1) In 2009, the Ministry of National Security (MNS) held a Symposium on Criminal Gangs in Jamaica. Among the key findings were:

- Over the past two decades, Jamaica has experienced an increase in criminal gang activity, especially in the Kingston Metropolitan Area, where on average 80% of all murders occur annually;
- The signing of a Peace Treaty between feuding gangs in St. Andrew Central, the control of bus terminals in Spanish Town by the major organized gangs and the rise of several gangs in St. James and Clarendon highlight the phenomena of gangs as an ongoing social crisis that critically and directly impacts on the state of crime and public safety in Jamaica;
- Gangs are seen to be involved not only in traditional forms of criminal activity but also have expanded their range of activities to include sophisticated and technologically driven crimes;
- The Jamaica Constabulary Force (JCF) estimated that there were at least two hundred (200) established gangs operating in Jamaica, mainly comprising of young men between the ages of 16 – 30 years old¹. Intelligence estimates showed that one hundred and twenty (120) of these gangs were actively engaged in shootings, murders, and other serious crimes such as car-jacking and theft, robberies, extortions, contract killings, and drug and gun smuggling; and,
- Despite the impact that gangs have on crime in Jamaica, there remain gaps in the understanding of the structure and organization of gangs, how gangs might be defined in the Jamaican context, and consequently how the issues might be effectively dealt with to ensure public safety and a reduction in crime and violence.

(2) In 2010, in response to the increasing gang related crimes and issues outlined by the aforementioned symposium, the European Commission in consultation with the MNS and JCF developed the terms of reference for a “Consultant to the Government of Jamaica for the design, development and implementation of its anti-gang Strategy.” The present document fulfills the key deliverable cited in those terms of reference:

(3) “In consultation with other local and international partners, drafting a three-year gang reduction strategy and action plan which addresses all aspects including gang prevention, investigation, disruption and dismantling.”

(4) This consultancy also follows on the events of May 2010 in Tivoli Gardens, Kingston, whereby a major gang leader was sought and eventually arrested. He was subsequently extradited to the USA, where he has pleaded guilty to several charges resulting in his pending potentially lengthy incarceration there. These events have provided a window of opportunity to the Government and to all concerned stakeholders to intervene firmly and to instigate a change of culture, away from the violence of the past, and towards a reconciliation of Jamaicans among themselves.

¹ Estimates on the number of gangs and gang members vary. Some place the number of active gangs at near 270.

(5) The methodology used to develop the strategy is well documented in the Final Report of the consultancy. For purposes of understanding the strategic plan, it is important to note that in developing the plan, the consultants had four guiding principles:

1. The process and the plan must be transparent.
2. The process and the plan must be inclusive.
3. The plan must incorporate best practices.
4. The plan should focus on building on current organizational structures.

(6) As the planning and early implementation went forward, the consultants realized that the three-year plan must take into account current government fiscal realities. There is likely to be little additional money available within the Jamaican government for a large investment into the Constabulary. Furthermore, while there may be funding available from donor countries, Jamaica can ill afford to wait; there should be a way to design a plan based on current resources.

(7) This plan, therefore, is an “opportunities cost” plan. It is a three year anti-gang strategy that combats gangs by restructuring and refocusing existing resources. However, there are other cost components that can be added on. As an example, a full implementation and funding of a recent analysis of forensic capabilities within the JCF (which may need to be revisited and updated) would significantly improve all investigations, including those which are gang related. These cost add-ons will be enumerated in section 3.1.

3. Developing a Community-Based Anti-Gang Reduction Philosophy

(8) In order to demonstrate the themes of building on current organizational structures and incorporating best practices, this plan has been developed as a Community-Based Anti-Gang Reduction strategy. Clearly, Community-Based Policing is an international norm. Moreover, the JCF has a good foundation in Community-Based Policing and continues to build on those efforts. Incorporated throughout this plan are the four principle tenants of Community-Based Policing:

- Organization-wide Philosophy;
- Problem Solving;
- Partnerships; and,
- Decentralized Decision Making

(9) The crux of this Community-Based Gang Reduction (CBGR) Philosophy is that it combines building enforcement capacity within the JCF with increased coordination, facilitation and awareness of social programs likely to prevent or inhibit gang activity. As the strategy matures, the process of safety through enforcement is replaced with safety through development.

3.1. Defining Gangs

(10) The legal definition of a gang is subject to change. Indeed, there is pending legislation which, if passed, would change the definition. For a 3-year plan to remain viable, it must take into account any potential changes by building in operational flexibility. This plan adopts an

operational view of gangs; it defines key operational terms so that they too will remain viable. Rather than utilize any of the legal definitions, this plan merges various sociological views on gangs and begins with a simple pyramid structure that represents what an organized gang becomes. It is understood that during various stages of development, gangs may not be as highly organized. However, even a newly founded gang seeks to replicate this structure. Therefore, from an operational viewpoint, this is a good representation of a gang.



3.2. Important Terms and Definitions

Gang Leadership: These persons meet the definition of a gang member. They are persons formerly referred to as “Dons.” They set the goals of the gang, establish control of membership and otherwise direct the activity of members. They should be referred to as “gang leaders.”

Hardcore Members: These persons meet the definition of a gang member. Additionally, they have either: 1) been imprisoned once and returned to the gang; 2) they have been identified as having likely carried out more serious gang crime; 3) they have been identified as potential future leadership of the gang.

Gang Member: As defined by legislation.

Gang Associate: These persons do not meet the definition of a gang member; however, they have been identified at least twice in the company of gang members and reasonable suspicion exists to support their identification as a gang associate.

At Risk Youth: These persons do not meet the definition of gang member. Generally, they are young men who live in the geographic and/or functional area of a gang and, based on delinquency factors such as school attendance, they are at risk of being recruited.

Gang Crime: Crime committed in order to facilitate gang goals.

Gang Related Crime: Crime committed by a gang member and facilitated by or caused by gang membership.

Imprisoned Gang Members: These persons meet the definition of a gang member. They may or may not be serving a prison sentence for a gang crime or gang-related crime. They continue gang association in prison and upon release are likely to return to the gang.

Judicially Supervised Persons: These persons may or may not meet the definition of a gang member. They are under some sort of judicially ordered supervision.


Diverted Youth: These persons meet the definition of “at risk youth” and are involved in a state or Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) sponsored activity.

Former Gang Member: At one time, these persons met the definition of a gang member. While they may still associate with active gang members, they do not participate in gang crime, nor gang-related crime; they may also be identified as a positive community influence.

3.3. Community-Based Gang Reduction (CBGR) Model

(11) The following model represents gang reduction through enforcement working together with gang reduction through development. On the left side, enforcement brings gang members into the judicial system; and on the right, social programs (development) draw gang members and potential gang members out of the gang. It is important to note that the model uses two-way arrows on the left to indicate that enforcement does not necessarily induce gang members to leave the gang; it may only temporarily prevent their participation.

(See diagram on next page)



4. Building JCF Capacity

4.1. An Operational View of Gangs


(12) Under this plan, the JCF CBGR Enforcement Philosophy is a ***“Focus on gangs based on a Public Safety Threat Assessment.”*** This is a divergence from the concept of “fighting crime” in that the enforcement focus is the “gang” and the crimes it commits; and, a Public Safety Threat Assessment of the gang directs and drives operations. A public safety threat assessment is used to determine how limited resources will be deployed. Factors in this threat assessment include but are not limited to:

- Longevity;
- Number of Members;
- Level of Organization;
- Reliance on Geography;
- Sophistication;
- Violence; and,
- Type of Crime.

(13) As an example, a large highly organized gang would likely take precedence over a small, newly formed “corner crew.” However, if the “corner crew” began to use violence to establish themselves, resources might be re-directed away from an investigation into the larger gang.

4.2. Jamaica Constabulary Enforcement Model

The following represents the JCF enforcement model:



(14) The model includes the reorganization of current resources as well as the formation of new units from existing resources. The following units are discussed in detail within this plan: Organized Crime Investigation Division (OCID) Gang Detail; Divisional Uniformed Gang Enforcement; Covert Tactical/Evidence Gathering; and Tactical Support/Suppression. Intelligence gathering and analysis is also examined. Development matrixes and timelines are included in the report.

4.3 Organized Crime Investigation Division Gang Detail

(15) One of the most insidious aspects of gangs is their tendency to evolve from street thugs toward highly organized criminal enterprises. Currently, the JCF has an OCID but does not have nation-wide investigative resources dedicated solely to gang crime.

(16) Since gang membership facilitates crimes, gangs do tend to specialize in crime and often use extreme violence to enforce gang goals. It is thus necessary to develop investigators who have a unique understanding of gang culture, gang members and gang structure. This investigative expertise will allow OCID investigators to launch and conduct gang centered criminal investigations and assist all JCF personnel in their investigations.

(17) The nation-wide gang investigation capacity should be developed within OCID because it:

- Already operates nation-wide;
- Already conducts some investigations involving gangs;
- Understands the concepts of investigative support;
- Works with international partners; and,
- has a vetting process.

4.3.1. Development Matrix (OCID Gang Detail)

Action	Objectives	Steps	Timeline / Costs
Establish a gang unit within Organized Crime Investigation Division. (OCID)	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Operate nation-wide. 2. Conduct complex gang investigations. 3. Provide investigative support to all JCF personnel. 4. Assist the National Intelligence Bureau with the analysis information. 5. Work with international partners. 6. Develop a gang expert training cadre. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Appoint unit leader 2. a) Create an administrative unit. b) Create a mission statement, operational policies and procedures, and job descriptions. 3. Staff Unit: Selection and vetting. 4. Train personnel 	<p>Precedent Activity: None</p> <p>Time: 120 days</p> <p>Cost: Reallocation of existing resources.</p>

4.4. Divisional Uniformed Gang Enforcement

(18) Within the JCF, as in many police agencies, there is a tendency to equate specialized units with non-uniformed assignments. However, many police agencies have a uniformed component to their anti-gang efforts. The consultants recommend that a uniformed anti-gang component be developed because experience and research indicate that a uniformed anti-gang enforcement component can provide:

- Systematic street level enforcement of minor crimes;
- Community visibility to anti-gang efforts;
- Systematic gathering of gang intelligence;
- Complementary activities to community-based policing;
- A tactical reserve for crisis response as well as pre-planned activities; and,
- A basis to build internal JCF gang expertise.

4.4.1. Development Matrix (Divisional Uniformed Gang Enforcement)

Action	Objectives	Steps	Timeline / Costs
Establish a dedicated uniformed gang enforcement unit in each geographic Division command.	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Targeted street level enforcement of minor crimes committed by gang members. 2. Gather gang intelligence. 3. Conduct operations based on OCID tasking. 4. General crime suppression. 5. Develop and provide gang expertise. 6. Attend community functions. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. In consultation with the leader of OCID gang unit, appoint Area leaders. 2. a) Create administrative units. b) Create a mission statement, operational policies and procedures, and job descriptions. 3. Staff Unit: Selection and vetting. 4. Train personnel 	<p>Precedent Activities:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Formation of OCID Gang Unit 2. Formation of covert evidence gathering unit. 3. Development of 8 hour Gang Awareness Course. 4. Development of 24 hour Advanced Gang Awareness Course. <p>Time: 360 days</p> <p>Cost:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Reallocation of existing resources. 2. Outside expertise for course development.

4.5. Covert Tactical/Evidence Gathering

(19) Currently, the lion’s share of JCF covert activities focuses on intelligence gathering, crisis response to crimes in progress and street crime interdiction. Evidence gathering is much different than intelligence gathering or the other stated covert activities. There are many separate units within the JCF working in a “plain clothes” covert manner. It is the authors’ opinion that one unit within the JCF should be trained and dedicated to covert evidence gathering for gang investigations. The consultants recommend this unit be seated, vetted and trained within the current Flying Squad.

4.5.1. Development Matrix (Covert Tactical/Evidence Gathering)

Action	Objectives	Steps	Timeline / Costs
Develop and dedicate covert evidence gathering and covert tactical resources within the current Flying Squad.	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Operate nation-wide. 2. Conduct covert evidence gathering at the direction of OCID Gang Unit. 3. Conduct covert tactical operations at the direction of OCID Gang Unit. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. In consultation with the leader of OCID gang unit, appoint sub- unit leader within Flying Squad. 2. a) Create administrative unit. b) Create a mission statement, operational policies and procedures, and job descriptions. 3. Staff Unit: Selection and vetting. 4. Train personnel. 	<p>Precedent Activity:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Formation of OCID Gang Unit 2. Development of 8 hour Gang Awareness Course. 3. Development of 40 hour Gang Investigations Course. <p>Time: 180 days</p> <p>Cost:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Reallocation of existing resources. 2. Outside expertise for course development. 3. Surveillance and tactical equipment.

4.6. Tactical Support/Suppression

(20) The Mobile Reserve is currently among the tactical resources used by the JCF. The consultants recommend that as JCF anti-gang capacity grows, the use of the Mobile Reserve should become more refined. As other anti-gang organizational components are realized, it would be beneficial to designate a single company within the Mobile Reserve as the anti-gang component. This would facilitate cross training, vetting and tactical cooperation.

4.6.1. Development Matrix (Tactical Support/Suppression)

Action	Objectives	Steps	Timeline / Costs
Designate one company of the Mobile Reserve as a Gang Response Unit.	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Operate nation-wide. 2. Provide a tactical reserve for crisis response as well as pre-planned activities. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. In consultation with the leader of OCID gang unit, appoint Area leaders. 2. a) Create administrative unit. b) Create a mission statement, operational policies and procedures, and job descriptions. 3. Staff Unit: Selection and vetting. 4. Train personnel. 	<p>Precedent Activity:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Formation of OCID Gang Unit. 2. Formation of covert evidence gathering unit. 3. Formation of Uniformed Enforcement Units. 4. Development of 8 hour Gang Awareness Course. <p>Time: 90 days</p> <p>Cost:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Reallocation of existing resources. 2. Outside expertise for course development.

4.7. Intelligence

(21) The consultants began their review by interviewing the head of the National Intelligence Bureau (NIB). After a thorough journey through the current intelligence gathering process, the consultants returned to top managers within the NIB and discussed the issues and deficiencies mentioned below. The NIB has just completed the first year of a three-year plan. Except as noted, the NIB has a cogent plan to address the stated issues. Furthermore, while a few of the NIB solutions are not exactly what the consultants might have recommended, the reasoning behind the intended solutions is solid and NIB should be encouraged to complete their plan.

4.7.1. National Intelligence Bureau

(22) The top level of the NIB was restructured during the first year of their plan. The current configuration of “input-analysis-output” is operational and appears to work well.

4.7.2. Vetting

(23) There are approximately 350 NIB personnel. Somewhere around 35% have been vetted via polygraph. All NIB personnel must be vetted as soon as possible.

4.7.3. Division Intelligence Units

(24) Each geographic division has a Division Intelligence Unit (DIU). However, in most cases, they are staffed by a mix of personnel. Some answer to the Division Commanding Officer; others within the same unit answer to NIB. This has caused all the problems one would associate with having a divided command. The NIB plan calls for all personnel to become NIB line employees. This transition is underway.

4.7.4. Intra-NIB Communication

(25) Fourteen of the nineteen DIUs have direct access to input and output of the NIB intelligence database. The five that do not have access, lack the requisite microwave communication infrastructure. This issue goes well beyond the purview of this consultancy. Suffice to say, the JCF has infrastructure deficiencies in terms of equipment, facilities and technology; however, they are aware of these and are working to address them.

4.7.5. Other Intelligence Units

(26) It would seem that every division, unit or section of the JCF has its own intelligence gathering unit. NIB is aware of this and informally designates some units as official DIUs and others as intelligence “cells.” It would be helpful to formalize this. In the consultants’ opinion, there should be two classifications: Intelligence Units and Intelligence Liaisons. The NIB, in consultation with the manager of a unit within the JCF, should determine which is most appropriate under the following guidelines:

- Intelligence Units mirror the NIB national paradigm of input-analysis-output;

- Intelligence Unit personnel are vetted; and,
- Intelligence Unit personnel have the necessary direct access to the national intelligence database.

If the current “unit” does not meet the above criteria, then it is a liaison unit.

4.7.6. Dissemination of Work Products

(27) Intelligence work products do not routinely reach the police constable on the street. In some instances, the work is not even produced. The NIB three-year plan has a solution for this. It involves the use of a briefing and debriefing sheet and institution of management controls.

4.7.7. Confidential and Covert Human Intelligence Sources

(28) There is a JCF Confidential and Covert Human Intelligence Sources policy (CCHIS). It is not widely instituted nor followed. Informants are the life’s blood of law enforcement. It could be the citizen who reports a crime, an officer who reports corruption, an offender looking for a deal or someone who is paid to work within a criminal organization for the police. Each of these has a different level of usefulness, reliability, liability and even danger. However, the police must use informants and they must have an effective and cogent system of oversight.

(29) JCF officials use informants constantly. While policy should be implemented, such implementation without proper training and infrastructure would bring many JCF functions to a grinding halt. This would not be in the best interest of public safety. The consultants recommend that the policy be reviewed and a measured implementation plan be developed.

4.7.8. Gang Expertise

(30) Gang expertise exists in the JCF but it is diffuse and often difficult to access. The implementation of the strategic plan will ultimately supply the JCF with focused and accessible expertise.

4.7.9. Generating Raw Information

(31) Raw intelligence does not routinely flow up the chain of command from the street. As an example, Police Constables do not routinely complete field interview cards. And the interview skills of the average Police Constable could be improved. The skills developed by recommendation 4.10.3 (Interview and Interrogation), if incorporated into Police Constable training, coupled with the NIB plan to increasingly centralize intelligence (4.7.3), will likely improve the flow of intelligence to and from the street.

4.7.10. Debriefing Arrested Persons

(32) Debriefing arrested persons is not an interrogation about the crime for which they were arrested. It is an interview about crime in general. In many instances, it is the genesis of developing a solid, reliable informant. The JCF does not routinely debrief arrested persons. The

consultants recommend that as part of its three-year plan, the NIB amend the plan to include a policy and procedure for debriefing arrested persons.

4.8. Training

4.8.1. Gang Awareness Course

(33) A key concept of the Community-Based Gang Reduction strategy is that it is adopted as a JCF-wide philosophy. As such, having a basic Gang Awareness Course is essential towards full implementation. The course outlined below, while not fully developed curriculum, gives the reader an idea of the necessary information required for every member of the JCF to be involved in the strategy. Based on the size of the JCF, it would take approximately three years for every member of the organization to attend the course.

Time	Title	Instructor	Objectives
Two Hour	What is a Gang?	TBA	1) define gangs 2) define gang structure 3) define gang members 4) define gang –related crime
Two Hours	The Context of Gangs of Jamaica	NIB	Overview of various gangs in Jamaica and how they relate to national and international issues.
One Hour	JCF Gang Reduction Strategy	OCID Gang Detail	Overview of National Gang Reduction Strategy
One Hour	Social Interventions	PIOJ	Overview of available social interventions
One Hour	Intelligence Gathering	NIB	1) Methods of gathering intelligence 2) Work products produced by NIB
One Hour	Informant Control	TBA	Overview of the Informant Control System

4.8.2. Advanced Gang Awareness Course

(34) While every member of the JCF should attend the basic course, personnel directly tasked with gang enforcement (the four operational units outlined in 3.3 through 3.7) should also attend an Advanced Gang Awareness Course. This three-day course should expand the basic training on the context of gangs, social interventions and enforcement strategies.

4.8.3. Gang Investigator Course

(35) This is a course developed by future OCID Gang Detail investigators designed to develop general gang crime investigation expertise throughout the JCF. In this strategy, since many gang and gang related crimes (as an example, homicide) will continue to be investigated by existing units, it is necessary to seed gang expertise throughout the Force. This would be a one-week course focusing on the context of gangs and investigative strategies.

4.8.4. Human Rights and Ethics

(36) Throughout the consultation, there was a recurring community concern regarding the conduct of police personnel. The JCF anti-gang efforts should include embedding ethics and human rights concepts in the core curriculum of the preceding three courses. Moreover, in addition to the recommended vetting, personnel assigned to the four core anti-gang units should include in their portfolio of training, attendance to any Ethics or Human Rights related training currently offered or developed in the future.

4.9. Media Relations

(37) The media can be a powerful tool in combating gang crime. The Anti-Gang Strategy considers the impact of the media by:

- Considering JCF Public Information Officer cadres as a priority for attendance to the Gang Awareness Course;
- Ensuring that all public statements and press releases use the words Gang Leader in lieu of the term “Don:” and,
- Ensuring that all public statements and press releases do not specifically name any gang.

4.10. Building Overall Capacity

(38) As was noted in the introduction, this plan is an “opportunities cost” plan. It is a three-year anti-gang strategy that combats gangs by restructuring and refocusing existing resources. However, there are other cost components that can be added on. This section enumerates those add-ons.

4.10.1 Cold Case Unit

(39) The JCF has a limited cold case team of retired JCF investigators whose contracts expired in the month of August 2011. The JCF should strongly consider the formation of a cold case unit. Because these units review cases in detail, they are excellent training vehicles. The consultants recommend that the JCF, in partnership with donor countries, develop a cold case squad that invites foreign detectives for short-term (30 to 60 day) assignments. During these assignments, a team of JCF investigators (consisting of one permanently assigned JCF Detective and one internal loanee) and one foreign investigator form an investigative and learning triad. In addition to knowledge transfer, it is likely that this configuration will be successful in solving five or more year-old homicides because: the JCF itself has significantly improved as a law

enforcement organization over the last five years; the triad brings new skills to the investigation; newer forensic and other technologies are present; and previous social, community and political barriers to the investigations are likely minimized by the passage of time.

4.10.2 Forensic Science

(40) The modern scientific analysis of evidence is crucial to the investigation of crime. As gangs and their crimes become more complex, the necessity to employ modern techniques also grows. The consultants conducted a site visit to the Major Investigations Team's Scene of the Crime Processing Unit. While the consultants did not conduct an in-depth analysis of current JCF forensic capabilities (this was done by consultants in 2007), they did inquire as to the opinions of various stakeholders regarding those capabilities. Moreover, the consultants reviewed the 2007 report. This report should be revisited and a determination made on the progress of the recommendations contained therein.

4.10.3 Interview and Interrogation

(41) One of the primary weaknesses of the JCF is in the area of interview and interrogation. This was a common theme among many people that the consultants interviewed. For the purposes of this report, interview refers to gathering verbal evidence from *witnesses* and interrogation refers to gathering verbal evidence from *suspected persons*. While the aforementioned homicide investigation training will include some training in this area, there are a number of intensive courses that would benefit JCF personnel. The consultants recommend that the JCF:

- Send all homicide investigators to interview and interrogation training;
- Send all future OCID gang investigators to interview and interrogation training; and,
- Incorporate the best practices taught in the aforementioned training into JCF courses.

4.10.4 One Island, One Police Force

(42) While there are historical reasons for Jamaica to have multiple policing agencies, today the situation creates inefficiencies with little benefit. Jamaica should strongly consider merging the agencies into one police force. Additionally, the idea of a "constabulary" is a direct result of Jamaica's history as a colony. There are strong feelings in various communities regarding the perceived culture of a "constabulary" as an imposed force. This cultural perception cuts both ways, and is counterproductive to community policing efforts. Perhaps, the merger is an opportunity for the different constabularies to take their place in history and for **Jamaican Police Force** to take center stage. There are obviously cost factors involved in such action.

Note: The following sections (4 through 7) of this Strategic Plan involve agencies outside the JCF. Thus, more extensive rationales are provided for the recommended actions as multiple stakeholders are involved. These stakeholders' activities must be extensively coordinated in order to provide the expected results; this will not be an easy task.

5. Coordination and Intervention

(43) The issue of coordination is central and crucial to the success of the entire anti-gang enterprise. It encourages and enhances the:

- Sharing of important information;
- Proper planning of mutually beneficial operations;
- Seamless execution of joint operations;
- Avoidance of waste of precious funds and duplication of efforts;
- Optimal use of intelligence for surgical and precise interventions; and
- Avoidance of the risk of overlap or counter-productivity in both jurisdiction and activities.

(44) Within most Organizations, and more so between them, there is often a strong tendency to protect one's sources, to maintain control over information, and to mistrust other stakeholders. This is a natural instinct and is understandable in certain circumstances. In effect, knowledge is Power. However, in the implementation of a Joint Action Plan, where each partner has a stake in obtaining a successful outcome, such tendencies become detrimental to the desired outcome and provide a tactical advantage to the adversary, who is capable of high levels of coordination towards the group's desired results.

(45) Good coordination of activities does not guarantee the success of operations – but it increases the chances of success by a factor of 10. International Organized Crime Syndicates are highly successful because they are result-oriented. They are “organized” – in other words, well-coordinated – so as to reap maximum benefits from their activities. It is the same for high-level gangs in Jamaica. Thus, any anti-gang strategy must respond with the same, if not better, fully functional coordination systems.

(46) The Community-Based Gang Reduction Plan presents a series of actions and activities which need to be implemented correctly, in the proper sequence, and very often in joint operations or in close cooperation between various partners. This type of well-planned and coordinated approach maximizes the possibility of a successful outcome. It is thus essential to establish the proper mechanisms in advance, in order to utilize these to the fullest extent possible.

(47) It is also quite clear that much work has already been undertaken in Jamaica towards better cooperation between stakeholders, in order to reach the goals put forward in various spheres of public and private activity. With regard to the critical issue of gangs, certain mechanisms are already in place, upon which one can build, and which can be enhanced and strengthened where necessary. Therefore, rather than establish new and competing bodies to coordinate the

implementation of this strategy, the requisite coordination tools are being integrated into existing entities, where feasible.

(48) Concretely, general governmental oversight, more specific strategic overview, and the involvement of funding groups (major international donors, private sector groups, concerned service groups) is included within the existing Government structures. An Inter-Ministerial Committee (IMC) is already charged with managing the re-engineering of the State. It operates through a Technical Working Group (TWG), which oversees and coordinates action in the different areas of concern, where innovative action is actively required. One of the sub-groups of this TWG is concerned with Security & Justice (S&JWG). (Refer to the diagram on Page 28)

(49) This sub-group, which is chaired by the MNS, could effectively act as the overall “Oversight Body” for the implementation of the Anti-Gang Strategic Plan (or eventually ‘the project’). The S&JWG can ensure that implementation proceeds smoothly and that any major snags are ironed out quickly and effectively. It can also ensure that donors are kept well informed of progress, that they continue to provide adequate funding to the effort, and that any revisions of planned activities are fully endorsed. Finally, they can act as the main interlocutor between Government policy and operations on the ground.

(50) Nevertheless, the Strategic Plan (or the project) will require two main operational entities in order to conduct daily activities.

- The first is an essential technical level Implementation Working Group, or IWG.
- The second is a small Secretariat tasked with direct implementation of the Strategic Plan.

5.1. Implementation Working Group

(51) The technical level Working Group – the “JCF Anti-Gang Strategic Plan Implementation Working Group” - or IWG is the main coordinating body for implementation of the Plan. This group consists of technical level partners with a direct role and interest in implementation of activities on the ground. This Group should meet once every six to eight weeks, in order to exchange information, to plan activities jointly, and to ensure proper implementation is taking place, according to schedule. Two such Group meetings have been held already, within the context of the establishment of the Strategic Plan: the first on 30 June, and the second on 8 September, both at the JCF Officer’s Club. A third meeting will be hosted by Planning Institute of Jamaica (PIOJ) before the consultants depart Jamaica, in early November².

(Development Matrix on next page)

² Initially called the TWG, it has been renamed the IWG, or the Implementation Working Group, in order to differentiate it from the higher level Government TWG, which governs the Security & Justice WG.

5.1.1 Development Matrix - Implementation Working Group

Action	Justification	Objectives	Steps	Timeline / Costs
Create operational IWG.	<p>1- Bring together technical stakeholders with strong interest in seeing gang-related criminal activities eliminated.</p> <p>2- Provide needed coordination capacity.</p> <p>3- Facilitate coordination by providing a forum for discussion of ideas, activities, and mutual reinforcement of support.</p> <p>4- Maximization of intervention and implementation capacity.</p> <p>5- Provide an avenue to reinforce the worth of and respect for the constable on the beat.</p>	<p>1- Increase awareness.</p> <p>2- Coordinate activities.</p> <p>a) Facilitate Social Services briefings at</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - JCF musters - Lectures - Regular training <p>b) Provide information contact cards with all Social Services info to police patrol officers.</p> <p>c) Pre-plan joint activities in certain designated at-risk communities.</p> <p>3- Facilitate personal contacts and mutual trust between all 'first responders'.</p> <p>4- Generally encourage proper implementation of activities.</p>	<p>1- Self-organize & continue to hold meetings.</p> <p>2- Appoint chairs.</p> <p>3- Create calendar of</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Meetings - Social Services briefings - Other events <p>4- Invite participants.</p> <p>5- Discuss pertinent and relevant gang-related issues.</p> <p>6- Arrange briefings for police staff (regular).</p> <p>7- Arrange visits to police community posts.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Work in now progress. - Second TWG meeting organized today. - Third meeting in late October (PIOJ). - No direct costs. - Indirect costs only.

5.2. Social Services Coordination

(52) During the First IWG meeting on 30 June, it was made abundantly clear through the PowerPoint presentation that any anti-gang Strategic Plan was not solely the responsibility and the burden of law enforcement agencies, and in particular, of the JCF; it was pointed out, to unanimous agreement, that the affected communities from which the gangs operate are extremely vulnerable to violence, have been excessively marginalized over time from Government intervention, and are in serious need of assistance from society, in a truly consistent and meaningful way, in order to rebuild their infrastructure and their social fabric. Only in this way can these communities be reintegrated into the common social fabric of Jamaica.

(53) During the June event, a definition of “gangs” was proposed, which would allow a more focused response to the problems at hand. A line was drawn between the top-tier “major gangs” which are intimately linked to Organized Crime Syndicates, and smaller, more loosely organized gangs, which operate on a limited scale, are not truly ruthless, are operating ‘part-time’, are described as “corner crews” or are simply made up of young profilers, or youth-at-risk. These lesser gangs were considered as distinct from the major players, and warranted a different approach than the “Big Boys.”

(54) When dealing with the Major Organized Crime syndicates, it is obviously essential to oppose a response of equal strength. This is the role and mandate of the law enforcement bodies, especially the Police Force. The JCF must, therefore, be equipped to confront, based on a public safety threat assessment, the vicious and ruthless major gangs which operate in the country. This must be done, of course, within the limits of the law and in full respect of basic Human Rights. If not, the response becomes identical to the provocation, and blurs the line between right and wrong. This is the purview of the JCF and is dealt with in the first part of this Strategic Plan.

(55) When dealing with the so-called “lower-tier” gangs, the approach must also be pragmatic and balanced, and not lead to a worsening of the situation. Many Social Service partners are already intimately involved with at-risk communities and youth, and are providing services and assistance which the Government has been unable to provide, and which the gang leaders are no longer in a position to provide once they are removed. However, despite their best efforts, these services are often limited to certain geographic areas, certain specific groups, or certain types of intervention, in addition to being limited by constrained funding problems. The impact is real, but not sufficiently widespread to make an irreversible difference.

5.2.1. Proposed Social Services Coordination

(56) In the present scenario, it is envisaged that the “Community Policing” commitment by the JCF will be amplified over the coming years. This concept means policing with the community, in full cooperation with the local citizenry. It does not mean changing the fundamental police mandate in order to provide certain services to the communities. In other words, the constable on the beat, with an enhanced profile and visibility, will truly become the first interface with the citizens living in a given community, will be the principal source of good information and knowledge about that community, and will be in a position to identify problems at the source in a preventive manner, if not a curative manner. This JCF officer will thus be in a position to forward information to the best respondent, often one of the Social Service providers, so as to activate intervention at street level without delay.

(57) This requires three prerequisites in order to be successful:

- Well trained and highly responsive police constables;
- A well prepared, active and supportive Social Services network; and,
- A strong coordination mechanism between the two.

(58) The first prerequisite above is the responsibility of the JCF. The second (network) requires the strengthening of various Social Service providers, where required, so that they may intervene as needed in response to requests received from the JCF first responders. The third

(coordination) requires the strengthening of a regular mechanism or tool which will allow all Social Service providers to exchange information, to share knowledge and experience, to cooperate more actively in their interventions, and to mutually reinforce each other's mandates. At the present time, there is a lack of such coordination between the social partners.

5.2.2. Recommendations for Social Services Coordination

(59) The following three recommendations are designed to improve social service coordination:

1. The PIOJ, which manages the Community Renewal Program (CRP) and its membership, and which also co-chairs the anti-gang IWG, should expand membership of the CRP umbrella group to include all concerned and capable Social Service groups. It should help foster greater capacity to respond to social needs by encouraging the providers to upgrade their capacity where required, and to better cooperate with other providers in order to reinforce response time capabilities. It should also assist in requesting funding from donors in order to maintain and upgrade capacity to provide requisite services to communities in need.
2. The essential idea behind this Strategic Plan is to build upon that which already exists. Thus, it would be more productive to reinforce the CRP coordination tool than to create a new one. This will require enlarging the membership of the CRP coordination umbrella to include all pertinent Social Service providers, so as to provide a maximum of services to those in need, both promptly and adequately. This body, which feeds directly into the IWG and which is managed by the PIOJ, should also be recognized as the primary tool for Social Service providers to interact in an official capacity, and to plan joint actions.
3. The umbrella group should further encourage and assist in the preparation and delivery of exposés on each other's areas of intervention to various JCF venues (musters, training events, seminars), where they can explain to the assembled police officers the value and pertinence of their respective intervention methods and capabilities. This would allow the police officers to gain first-hand knowledge of the services available. It should also prepare a list of Service Providers (on a plasticized pocket card) for distribution to all police first responders, and containing name of organization, contact persons and phone numbers in case of emergency.

(Development Matrix on next page)

5.2.3. Matrix - Social Services Coordination

Action	Justification	Objectives	Steps	Timeline / Costs
<p>Widen and strengthen Social Services umbrella group, under PIOJ's CRP as a basic coordination mechanism to:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Address the gang issue more directly and coherently; 2. Ensure the capacity to respond rapidly and effectively to calls for assistance. 	<p>Clearly define the roles and inputs of each Social Service provider in at-risk communities, so as to :</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Increase inter-service complementarities; 2. Avoid overlap and duplication of tasks; 3. Maximize impact; 4. Better utilize limited funds. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Ensure coordination among Social Service first respondents (CRP). 2. Ensure free flow of information among participant groups. 3. Ensure and facilitate mutual assistance when required. 4. Via IWG, ensure the capacity to respond rapidly to JCF initiated or sponsored requests for assistance. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Expand and consolidate the CRP working group to include more Social Service providers. 2. Prepare user-friendly listing of Social Service contacts for use by JCF constables on the beat, in both electronic and hard copies - (based on COMET directory). 3. Prepare focused interventions at JCF events, in order to present the various Social Service providers directly to the JCF first responders. 4. Plan on-going active participation in regular IWGs. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Build on and strengthen present CRP working group. No cost. -Establish written Terms of Reference for each Group. (60 days) No cost implication. -Prepare contact list in pocket-sized format, for distribution to JCF constables (60 days). - Prepare electronic version of contact list (120 days) for virtual access. -Print above reference cards and distribute to JCF (30 days). Cost = donor funds? -Prepare short briefing interventions for presentation at musters, training sessions and lectures. (60 days)

5.3. Oversight

(60) An essential executive and policy level Implementation Overview Committee (IOC), which is required in order to guide the actions and the decisions of the IWG, was initially foreseen as an independent body designed uniquely for the requirements of the present Strategic Plan. However, it has become apparent that such a coordination mechanism already exists, as part of the overall Government Strategic Coordination effort. In fact, the Government of Jamaica has instituted a wide ranging TWG, under an Inter-Ministerial Committee tasked with coordinating all Government actions. This TWG is sub-divided into more specific Working Groups by sector; and under the National Crime Prevention and Community Safety Strategy, one of these concerns Security & Justice, as stated above. It is, therefore, felt that the S&JWG can and should play the role of oversight provider for this Strategic Plan. The role of the original IOC is thus incorporated and subsumed into the existing mechanism, which is chaired by the MNS.

(Development Matrix on next page)

5.3.1. Development Matrix - Oversight (S&JWG)

Action	Justification	Objectives	Steps	Timeline / Costs
<p>- Ensure S&JWG adapted, empowered and motivated to oversee implementation of anti-gang Strategic Plan.</p> <p>- Provide necessary sensitization and briefing of members, in order to secure their commitment to timely and proper guidance and implementation.</p>	<p>1- Bring together senior stakeholders with a vested interest in seeing gang-related criminal activities eliminated.</p> <p>2- Provide oversight for implementation of the Strategic Plan through projected activities.</p> <p>3- Provide a forum for donor governments & national authorities to review implementation of activities, to amend actions as required, & to provide guidance to IWG.</p> <p>4- Provide appropriate forum to address all funding issues.</p> <p>5- Provide appropriate forum to exchange views between senior officials (Govt & Donors) on the gang situation.</p>	<p>1- Make sure proper implementation of programmed activities is achieved.</p> <p>2- Oversee proper funding of the project (Plan).</p> <p>3- Oversee correct disbursement of funds.</p> <p>4- Provide guidance to the IWG, as appropriate.</p> <p>5- Provide donor support and clear input into the entire process.</p> <p>6- Speed up approval and disbursement mechanisms with donor community.</p> <p>7- Promote sharing of pertinent information among stakeholders.</p>	<p>1- Organize & hold meetings (quarterly).</p> <p>2- Appoint specific chairs for this Plan.</p> <p>3- Create calendar of</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Meetings - Other events <p>4- Invite participants.</p> <p>5- Decide on rotational venues for sub-groups, as required .</p> <p>6- Discuss pertinent implementation issues and other relevant matters.</p> <p>7- Use forum as a unique and privileged space for senior officials to address gang-related issues in productive fashion.</p>	<p>Invite concerned officials to first meeting concerning the anti-gang Strategic Plan (at MNS?) (Within 45 days).</p> <p>Hold first such meeting.</p> <p>Approve implementation schedule.</p> <p>Decide on next venue.</p> <p>Costing : no direct costs involved.</p>

5.4. Implementation Secretariat

(61) The diagram on page 27 provides a visual appreciation of the proposed structures based on that which already exists. The Strategic Plan IWG is central to implementation of the Plan. It interacts constantly with the various concerned stakeholders, led by the JCF and the key Social Service Providers (under the CRP). Other important stakeholders must also contribute: the Jamaica Defense Force, the Private Sector, the Judiciary, the Financial Investigations Division, Academia, and even the Parish level Committees, who are the closest partners to the communities.

(62) Once the structure is in place and is functioning, implementation of the Plan (project) will become fluid, and will bear results. It is, however, highly important to obtain consensus and full adherence to the procedures set out – in advance – in order to ensure and facilitate proper implementation of activities, and to provide maximum probability of reaching stated goals.

Recommendations:

1. For optimal day-to-day implementation and coordination of actions and input, a small Secretariat will be required (manager, secretary, driver/messenger) in order to ensure correct implementation of the Strategic (project) Plan; proper accounting of funds; and timely reporting on a regular basis, to both the concerned national partners and to the specific funding entities. The Secretariat operates full-time, as part of the implementation process. It also utilizes the services of regular ad-hoc technical consultants, as needed.
2. This Secretariat will be guided by an IWG which will act to increase Coordination and facilitate Awareness among Stakeholders. It will also guide the program manager on general implementation of the Strategic Plan. The IWG meets every six to eight weeks, and is co-chaired by the JCF and by PIOJ.
3. The IWG will in turn coordinate all anti-gang related interventions with other such working groups (by sector), through a higher level S&JWG, chaired by the MNS. This working group represents one area of government concern and is closely linked through a TWG to all other concerned sectors. This working group meets on a regular basis (every three or four months). It can also meet on an ad-hoc basis, if need be.

General Organizational Chart Strategic Coordination



6. Economic and Financial Crimes

(63) Everyone agrees that it is crucial to seriously reduce and limit criminal gang violence and influence in Jamaica without any hesitation. This effort has already begun and can only serve to enhance the country's attraction for tourists, foreign investors and development partners; furthermore, it could enable the country's amazing energy and immense creativity to be more fully and positively expressed and it could also allow the country to begin to close the gap between the hugely underprivileged classes and those with traditional power. This will be a lengthy and arduous process which will take many years to accomplish, but which is essential to future peace and prosperity.

(64) It has become increasingly clear to the consultants that traditional law enforcement efforts alone will be insufficient to resolve the very intricate and complex issues at hand. Organized Crime gangs express themselves in many ways and are increasingly concentrated on manipulating the numerous economic and financial aspects of crime. Money laundering, fraud, cybercrime, lotto scam, tax evasion, bribery, extortion and corruption; these have all existed for years but they are now increasingly attracting local criminal activity. Yet these types of crime require a sober, low key environment in which to thrive. They also further extend far beyond the traditional "gang" environment. They can be found in all segments of society, in more 'sober' settings, and can generally be defined as "Economic and Financial Crimes" (EFCs).

(65) Some major violent gangs have now been neutralized or have moved away (either forcibly or through choice) from traditional "garrison" models and from traditional dominant political influence, toward the realm of authentic "international organized crime." Increasingly, it is greed that drives the gangs. As this shift occurs, the type of crime involved also reaches beyond the traditionally defined "gangs," and blends into many other, more prosperous sectors of society. This type of criminality, loosely defined as "corruption," requires a high level of sophistication and a similarly sophisticated response. Such an approach also has the merit of avoiding the further marginalization of the most vulnerable segments of society to the exclusion of others. That is the powerful are also involved in questionable and detrimental activities and must in turn be held accountable.

(66) Corrupt practices eat away at the heart of any society. Impunity creates a blatant sense of inequality, which in turn breeds lack of confidence in authority, resentment, anger, disrespect and violence. EFCs are physically non-violent, but can perhaps be even more detrimental to social development than certain types of ghetto violence. Furthermore, there is a direct link between the two since most crime eventually relates back to economic welfare and prosperity. Although there are presently well-established anti-corruption bodies in various government departments and private companies in Jamaica (including within the JCF), these can only address issues of direct concern to them. The Government of Jamaica also has singular anti-corruption legislation on its books (Corruption Prevention Act 2000 and Regulations 2003), but the Act would appear to lack sufficient teeth to effectively enforce the fight against corrupt practices, or else there is a lack of political will to prosecute, since very few convictions are ever obtained.

6.1. Proposal for dealing with Economic and Financial Crimes

(67) There are a number of Economic and Financial Investigation entities which are already operational in Jamaica. Most of these are mandated to deal specifically with financial crime and corruption issues within a very well defined context. Such bodies are located in the Ministry of Finance (FID), in the Contractor General's office, in several law enforcement bodies (JCF, JDF ...), inside many professional orders (e.g., the Bar Association), and in a number of private sector firms. However, there is no one single entity which has the power to prosecute such crimes in a structured, systematic and methodical way all over Jamaica, regardless of who may be involved.

(68) It is strongly felt that the Jamaican authorities should seriously consider establishing a fully independent body, outside the traditional Law Enforcement agencies, in order to deal specifically with all forms of EFCs, wherever that may effectively occur. This body should have wide powers of financial intelligence gathering, investigation and direct prosecution before the courts. In addition, this type of very sophisticated crime requires a high level team of very qualified operatives, working in close coordination, with specialized knowledge of financial systems, banking, electronic technologies and international economics. This would require that personnel be recruited or seconded from diverse sectors of society, receive additional special training, and be mentored in practical operations. It would require privileged access to all manner of financial intelligence (ideally from a well-structured Financial Investigations Unit).

(69) It is not the intention of the consultants to propose the establishment of a new entity when it is not absolutely necessary. As a matter of fact, the FID in the Ministry of Revenue already possesses a very solid base and good track record as a credible and effective tool with which to combat EFCs. It has solid leadership, quality staff (both permanent and seconded), access to an operational FIU, and is presently benefiting from international assistance in order to consolidate its internal structures in line with international best practices. In our opinion, it is now properly operational and requires limited additional reinforcement in order to render it a first-class EFCs bureau, able to deal serious blows to corruption, money laundering and other forms of EFCs in the country. This in no way detracts from the essential work being done by the other concerned entities mentioned previously. Rather it serves to reinforce their tasks.

(70) This being said, the FID Act needs to be revised in order to guarantee its independence from any form of interference whatsoever, be it social, economic, political or other. It is absolutely necessary for this body to be completely independent. Its funding must be a matter of due course and not subject to budgetary upheavals. It must also answer to a fully independent authority (such as Parliament or the Governor General). It should be governed by a Board, or "Committee of Sages," composed of 7 Jamaicans of great proven integrity, to be selected by their peers among citizens who are deemed able and worthy to serve on this Board. One of the seven members shall be chosen by the Board to serve as its Director. All members shall also be thoroughly vetted in order to guarantee their total impartiality when dealing with EFCs issues.

(71) Such a structure would also require that specific judges be identified to hear these cases in court, after having been provided with supplementary training in the areas with which they should already be both familiar and comfortable. This does not necessarily mean dedicated courts, as this may not be legal. However, some judges are more comfortable than others with

EFC cases and the system would benefit from their expertise in these matters. Furthermore, the designation would help expedite hearings, increase the number of convictions, free up other judges to concentrate on other difficult cases, and generally enhance public trust in a system seen as impartial and effective in rendering justice.

(72) It is felt that such a team could be assembled and trained within six months, and could produce results (convictions) within 18 months. This would likely have a major psychological impact on Jamaican society and would provide the necessary impetus to begin changing the socio-political culture of the country. Such a step would also help greatly to eliminate the gang culture which plagues Jamaica at the present time. Perhaps, those individuals who may escape the tentacles of the anti-gang laws would eventually be snared by the new FID. As an example, one will remember that one of the biggest gangsters in the history of the USA, Al Capone, was convicted of income tax evasion, not of gang related crime. A renewed FID would also provide tangible power of prosecution against anyone who could be involved in corrupt activities. It is estimated that such a body could deal a major blow to corruption in Jamaica within three years – at which time it could (possibly) be subsumed into the regular JCF command structure, if so desired. (Please see the attached graph which presents the proposed structure).

6.2. Recommendations Economic and Financial Crimes

1. Continue to reinforce the internal structure of FID through formulation of proper rules and regulations in line with international best practices. (Joint COMET/GoJ venture)
2. Amend the FID Act without delay, in order to guarantee full independence to the body, both financially and in its reporting structure. The FID should in turn answer to a Committee of Sages (CoS), composed of seven Jamaicans of irreproachable integrity, one of whom shall act as Director of the Committee.
3. Through the CoS, this entity shall report directly to an independent national entity (Parliament or the Governor General). This shall ensure its ability to function without any form of interference whatsoever.
4. A number of judges shall be designated to hear EFC cases and to thus speed up the process of rendering justice in such cases, which also require a solid grasp of finance, IT and other technical issues of critical importance. (see the Chapter on the Judiciary).

6.3. Development Matrix - Economic and Financial Crimes

Action	Justification	Objectives	Steps	Timeline / Costs
<p>Establish or strengthen a fully operational, independent and universal body, with the official mandate and competence to investigate and prosecute all economic & financial crime offenders, wherever they may be in Jamaica.</p> <p>Provide an enhanced and sophisticated national capacity to combat EFCs, in close coordination with other national entities and international bodies dedicated to this aim.</p> <p>Establish this body as a <i>neutral and fully independent body</i>, or Directorate, answering to an independent oversight group, or ‘Committee of Sages’.</p>	<p>1- Bring together in one entity <i>all</i> those persons with technical competence in the area of EFC, in order to reduce the incidence of such criminality throughout Jamaican society.</p> <p>2- Enhance the capacity to follow the money trail when dealing with gangs & all forms of Organized Crime.</p> <p>3- Provide highly needed coordination capacity, in conjunction with the anti-gang IWG.</p> <p>4- Willfully sustain such an entity where the JCF, the CG, Inland Revenue & other stakeholders can come together in order to combat all forms of EFCs nationwide, including corruption.</p>	<p>1- Increase awareness of Financial Crime.</p> <p>2- Establish a fully independent body, free of any form of influence whatsoever, to combat EFCs, and in particular corruption.</p> <p>3- Provide wide ranging powers of investigation and prosecution of all forms of economic & financial crime (EFCs).</p> <p>4- Coordinate activities: - JCF anti-corruption unit - Contractor General - Inland revenue - All other such bodies</p> <p>5- Obtain convictions of major criminal offenders in this area.</p> <p>6- Significantly reduce incidence of major corruption in country within 3 years.</p>	<p>1- Formulate proposal for creation of enhanced FID, for adoption by Parliament.</p> <p>2- Set up independent physical entity, answering directly to Parliament.</p> <p>3- Select Director, select staff members, & provide equipment.</p> <p>4- Enhance FIU (financial intelligence), in close coordination with JCF/NIB & JDF.</p> <p>5- Establish oversight group (7 people of proven irreproachable integrity) to ensure transparency.</p> <p>6- Identify judges with particular interest and knowledge of EFC & provide additional training.</p> <p>7- Prosecute a few high profile cases & obtain convictions.</p>	<p>1- 45 days – cost = consultant fees.</p> <p>2- 150 days – premises, salaries, equipment, electronic interface. Costs = to be borne by project funds and government in-kind contribution.</p> <p>3- 30 days – confirm FID Director and members of oversight group / “Committee of Sages”.</p> <p>4- 60 days – identify judges and courts.</p> <p>5- Provide requisite additional training to judges & magistrates (2 x 15 days). Costs borne by project.</p> <p>6- Obtain first convictions within 180 days of judges being selected. No cost.</p>

7. Judicial

(73) A crucial element of any anti-gang Strategy is the ultimate capacity of the State to successfully prosecute and convict offenders, in particular the most serious organized criminal gangsters and their financiers. Pertinent legislation must be up-to-date and sufficiently focused to allow prosecution of these offenders swiftly and correctly, and the judicial system must be strong and efficient enough to effectively render impartial justice. The successful conviction of key criminal offenders ultimately sends out a message of “zero tolerance,” which must be publicly and repeatedly stated by the Government. This may ultimately be the single most effective way to restore public confidence in Government institutions and in the Rule of Law in Jamaica.

(74) A summary overview Report on the legislative aspects of the issue was provided by the consultants in June as part of this effort. This succinct overview of pertinent legislation presently established within the Jamaican Criminal Justice System (being presented to Parliament as amendments) or being considered in draft form for further fine-tuning, provides a fairly good idea of the legislative tools available to the system in order to complete the process of attacking and reducing the impact of gangs in Jamaica. It is, admittedly not within the remit of this consultancy to provide in-depth analysis of the legislation; yet it allows the ultimate step in the chain of “identification-investigation-prosecution-conviction” to be better understood and strengthened. Without the valid end result, the rest of the effort will seem in vain.

(75) At the present time, the judicial system would appear to be extremely encumbered, overloaded and slow to adjudicate cases presented before it. This can seemingly be attributed to many different factors, among which the following can be cited:

- Some laws are outdated, inadequate, ill-conceived, or simply absent from the statutes.
- Some cases are not adequately prepared by prosecutors, referring to the wrong articles of law, or are incomplete, thus providing the judges no choice but to acquit.
- Some cases are drawn out by certain verbose lawyers who tend to showcase in court.
- There would seem to be a serious case management problem in the courts, whereby the efficiency of the system needs to be heightened through better use of IT, and better distribution of cases to the judges.
- There would appear to be a deficit of qualified human resources in a support role. There is also a dearth of judges to hear cases, although their number has recently been increased (on paper) to 40 from only 30.
- Even with the increase in the number of judges, there remains an inadequacy of space for courtrooms, judges’ offices, holding rooms for witnesses, and general office space for support staff. It should be said here that some construction is taking place across from the Supreme Court Building, which should ease the problem to some extent in Kingston.
- There is presently a backlog of over 500 cases yet to be heard by the courts. This situation needs to be dealt with urgently, perhaps with the assistance of Commonwealth countries, through the temporary attachment of judges to address this backlog and move the system back into fully functional mode.

- Finally, more specialization is required for judicial system support staff, in addition to those adjudicating, in order to render the system more efficient and seamless, when dealing with the gang issue.

(76) The Government of Jamaica is presently embarked upon a program of Judicial Reform, in cooperation with the Government of Canada. This endeavor seeks to strengthen the Judiciary in Jamaica by addressing several of the concerns expressed above. Progress is being made, and there is the expectation that the fluidity of the system will be increased substantially within the next few years. This is extremely important from the point of view of gang control, in addition to other areas of concern, since the final outcome of the entire process is crucial to its success. There must be the real perception that justice is being rendered, in order to promote trust and credibility among the population, thus ensuring increased cooperation and collaboration in stemming the violent crime epidemic in the country.

7.1. Recommendations in the Judicial area

(77) The consultants will not make specific recommendations here since the issue is not part of the ToR, nor are they sufficiently qualified to do so. However, it is important to express the consultants' absolute belief that without results, in the form of concrete convictions of major offenders, the efforts to consolidate the JCF, the Social Service Providers, the FID, the legislation and the requisite coordination mechanisms, through a revised Anti-gang Strategic Plan, will not have achieved their ultimate goal. It is essential to formulate the *general recommendation* here to push forward tirelessly and relentlessly with the reform process and with increased management capacity in the judicial system. This is a sine qua non for success.

7.2. Vertical Prosecution

(78) The consultants focused on the JCF, the Service providers, coordination mechanisms and financial crime; thus only a cursory review was dedicated to the larger justice system such as prosecutorial framework, courts and prisons. However, one theme that did emerge was that of having a vertical prosecution framework for gang crime. In this framework, prosecutors are specifically trained on gang issues and gang crime. The prosecutors work closely with law enforcement personnel, even during the preliminary phases of an investigation, and remain attached to a particular case until final disposition.

8. Program Management

(79) As stated above, a small Secretariat tasked with direct implementation of the Strategic Plan (or the project) will be essential. This entity will be headed by a "program manager", with on-going expertise provided by a visiting expert law enforcement adviser, together with one administrative secretary and one driver/messenger. This entity shall be funded within the context of the Strategic Plan (or project) in order to ensure proper day-to-day implementation of planned activities. It will also ensure on-going and correct disbursement of funds, as well as appropriate reporting activities. It will be known as the Strategic Plan Implementation Secretariat (SPIS). It will report to the IWG for general technical matters, and to the funding body or bodies for financial matters and overall reporting tasks.

9. Community-Based Gang Reduction Three-Year Flowchart

Activity	Year 1				Year 2				Year 3			
	Q 1	Q 2	Q 3	Q 4	Q 1	Q 2	Q 3	Q 4	Q 1	Q 2	Q 3	Q 4
A - JCF – OCID /gang unit												
A – 1 Appoint Unit Leader	█											
A – 2 Create Administrative Unit	█											
A – 3 Mission statement, Policies, Procedures, Job descriptions		█										
A – 4 Selecting & Vetting of staff		█										
A – 5 Training of personnel			█	█								
B - JCF – Uniformed Gang Enforcement												
B – 1 Appoint Area Leaders			█									
B – 2 Create Administrative Units			█									
B – 3 Mission statement, Policies, Procedures, Job descriptions				█								
B – 4 Selecting & Vetting of staff				█								
B – 5 Training of personnel					█	█						
C - JCF – Covert Tactical Evidence Gathering												
C – 1 Appoint sub-unit leader in Flying Squad			█									
C – 2 Create Administrative Unit			█									
C – 3 Mission statement, Policies, Procedures, Job descriptions				█								
C – 4 Selecting & Vetting of staff				█								
C – 5 Training of personnel					█	█						

Activity	Year 1				Year 2				Year 3			
	Q 1	Q 2	Q 3	Q 4	Q 1	Q 2	Q 3	Q 4	Q 1	Q 2	Q 3	Q 4
D - JCF – Tactical Support / Suppression												
D – 1 Appoint Area Leaders												
D – 2 Create Administrative Unit												
D – 3 Mission statement, Policies, Procedures, Job descriptions												
D – 4 Selecting & Vetting of staff												
D – 5 Training of personnel												
E - JCF - Intelligence / NIB												
E – 1 Vetting of staff												
E – 2 Microwave hook-ups												
E – 3 Intelligence Units & Liaisons												
E – 4 Briefing / Debriefing sheets												
E – 5 Informants policy & planning												
E – 6 Field Interview cards												
E – 7 Interrogation / Interview												
F - JCF - Anti-gang Training												
F – 1 Gang Awareness Course												
F – 2 Advanced Gang Awareness												
F – 3 Gang Investigator Course												
F – 4 Human Rights & Ethics												
F – 5 Media relations												
G - JCF - Add-ons to consider												
G – 1 Cold Case Unit												
G – 2 Forensic Science												
G – 3 Interview & Interrogation												
G – 4 One Police Force / merger												

Activity	Year 1				Year 2				Year 3			
	Q 1	Q 2	Q 3	Q 4	Q 1	Q 2	Q 3	Q 4	Q 1	Q 2	Q 3	Q 4
H - Coordination & Intervention												
H – 1 Plan Implementation - IWG												
H – 2 Soc. Services umbrella - CRP												
H – 3 Oversight Group – S&JWG												
H – 4 Implementation Secretariat												
I - Economic & Financial Crimes												
I – 1 Independent FID - amend Act												
I – 2 Enhance staff & equipment												
I – 3 Choose Oversight Committee												
I – 4 Upgrade judges’ knowledge												
I – 5 Prosecute & Convict												
J - Judicial system												
J – 1 Continue Justice Improvem’t												
J – 2 Vertical Gang Prosecution												
Z - Immediate / Short-term												
Z – 1 Interview Cards												
Z – 2 Reference to Social Services												
Z – 3 Website – link to Soc. Serv.												
Z – 4 Basic individual equipment												
Z – 5 Job Descriptions												
Z – 6 Refresher training CDs												
Z – 7 Change of Name (JPF?)												